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NOTES AND COMMENTS
THE DECLINE AND FALL OF TAX-IMMUNE SALARIES
A DISCUSSION OF THE O'KEEFE CASE
It is probable that John Marshall, when he handed down the decision
in M'Culloch v. Maryland,' little knew that his opinion would be the base
of a mountain of litigation over immunity from taxation. In the course
of holding that a state could not lay a discriminatory tax upon a national
bank, the renowned Chief Justice went on to say, "This great principle is,
that the constitution and the laws made in pursuance thereof are supreme.
• . . From this . . . other propositions are deduced as corollaries ...
These are, 1st. that a power to create implies a power to preserve. 2d.
That a power to destroy, if wielded by a different hand, is hostile to,
and incompatible with these powers to create and to preserve. 3d. That
where this repugnancy exists, that authority which is supreme must
control, not yield to that over which it is supreme."' 2 And then came
that much-quoted, misquoted statement, "The power to tax involves the
power to destroy. . .. "s
A sound decision, doubtless; and it was followed by another sound de-
cision in Weston v. Charleston,4 holding unconstitutional a city ordinance
assessing a tax upon Federal bonds and exempting state obligations. But
the opinion went on to say sweepingly, "If the right to impose the tax
exists, it is a right which in its nature acknowledges no limits." The im-
plication is obvious-even nondiscriminatory taxes against the Federal
government are invalid, because of the impossibility of distinguishing
between burdensome and non-burdensome taxes.
The words were followed as gospel in Dobbins v. Commissioners of
Erie County,5 which held that a nondiscriminatory tax on all property,
including offices held by the taxpayer, could not be applied to the post of
1 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. Ed. 579 (1819).
2 At L. Ed. 606.
8 At L. Ed. 607. Compare the words of Justice Holmes: "The supreme court of
the state upheld the tax. . . . It seems to me that the state court was right.
I should say plainly right, but for the effect of certain dicta of Chief Justice
Marshall which culminated in or rather were founded upon his often quoted
proposition that the power to tax is the power to destroy. In those days it was
not recognized as it is today that most of the distinctions of the law are distinc-
tions of degree. If the states had any power it was assumed that they had all
power, and that the necessary alternative was to deny it altogether. But this
court which so often has defeated the attempt to tax in certain ways can defeat
an attempt to discriminate or otherwise go too far without wholly abolishing the
power to tax. The power to tax is not the power to destroy while this court sits."
Dissenting in Panhandle Oil Co. v. Miss. ex rel. Knox, 277 U.S. 218 at 233, 48
S. Ct. 451, 72 L. Ed. 857 at 859 (1928). But see New York ex rel. Rogers v. Graves,
299 U.S. 401, 57 S. Ct. 269, 81 L. Ed. 306 (1937).
4 2 Pet. 449, 7 L. Ed. 481 at 487 (1829). The immunity "safeguards every State
against federal tax on its governmental agencies or operations. Its application
does not depend upon the amount of the exaction, the weight of the burden or the
extent of the resulting interference with sovereign independence. Where it applies,
the principle is an absolute one wholly unaffected by matters or distinctions of
degree." Dictum in Trinityfarm Const. Co. v. Grosjean, 291 U.S. 466 at 471, 54
S. Ct. 469, 78 L. Ed. 918 at 920 (1934).
5 16 Pet. 435, 10 L. Ed. 1022 (1842).
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the Captain of a United States Revenue Cutter. However, there was a
second ground to the decision, maintaining that, because the compensa-
tion was fixed by Congress in its discretion, a tax by a state conflicts
with laws made in pursuance of the constitution by reducing the pay of
such an official.
The doctrine somersaulted to the converse in Collector v. Day6 to hold
that the Federal government could not lay an income tax on the salary
of a state official. There a probate judge of a county in Massachusetts,
whose salary was fixed by law and payable out of the state treasury,
was held exempt, because he was an instrumentality to carry out the
powers of the state government which could not be interfered with and
because his salary was inseparably connected with his office. State and
Federal government are "separable and distinct sovereignties, acting
separately and independently of each other, within their respective
spheres;,," although the dissent argued that there was a difference, since
the general government was the common government of all and could be
depended upon to watch the interests of its member states.
Culminating in that main authority, then, the theory has been that,
since the two governments are independent within their spheres, the in-
strumentalities of each must be immune from taxation by the other.
It has been believed that the power to tax endangers a governmental
function even in the case of a nondiscriminatory, non-burdensome tax.
The Supreme Court, in limiting this doctrine, has ruled off three dimen-
sions. First, it has limited the exemption to governmental functions, and
this limitation is obviously a sound corollary to the Day case. Second,
the person claiming the privilege of tax-exemption must be a state em-
ployee-which is debatable, since a state might be crippled just as effec-
tively by alienating its independent-contractor instrumentalities. One
annotator believes that this limitation should be discarded, remaining
only to be used as some evidence as to whether the person sought to be
assessed is really a government instrumentality.8 Third, there has crept
into the cases of today the thought that, even though the taxpayer per-
forms a governmental function, even though he is a state employee, he
ought to be taxable if the burden on the state is slight. This seems to,
cut off a large group of cases in which, under the sweeping opinions of
the earlier authorities, the salaries would have been held tax-exempt.
6 11 Wall. 113, 20 L. Ed. 122 (1871).
7 At Wall. 124, L. Ed. 126. The case was immediately followed by United States
v. Ritchies, Fed. Cas. No. 16, 168 (1872), holding a state's attorney exempt; and
Freedman v. Sigel, Fed. Cas. No. 5,080 (1873), holding a superior court judge
exempt. See also United States v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 17 Wall. 322, 21 L. Ed.
597 (1873), holding it unconstitutional for Congress to tax a municipality.
8 "This position is obviously erroneous. The ultimate test to be applied in
determining whether such compensation is subject to taxation by the Federal
government is whether the person rendering the services can be considered as an
agency or instrumentality of the state. This status is best established by proof
that the person rendering the services was an officer or employee, but such proof
is not indispensable. A person may be considered as an agency or instrumentality
of the state without being an officer or employee." Note, 93 A.L.R. 190.
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The Governmental Function Limitation
South Carolina v. United States 9 allowed a Federal license tax on dis-
pensers of liquor appointed by the state, the profits of which went to the
state, saying that the decisions indicate "that the thought has been that the
exemption of state agencies and instrumentalities from national taxation
is limited to those which are of a strictly governmental character, and
does not extend to those which are used by the state in the carrying on
of an ordinary private business." This was followed by Flint v. Stone
Tracy Company,'0 holding that railroad and rapid transit companies,
though public service corporations of the state, were subject to a Federal
excise tax, since they were "no part of the essential governmental func-
tions of a state .... "
A later case1 allowed the exaction of customs duties on materials to
be used by a state university, on the ground that the boundary of the inter-
governmental immunity doctrine had been reached. In Ohio v. Helver-
ing,12 again a state dealing in liquor was taxed by the Federal govern-
ment, and the doctrine of the South Carolina case was broadened.1 3
The salary of a public officer was held to be taxable in Helvering v.
Powers.14 There the Supreme Court assumed, as the Circuit Court had
held, that members of the board of trustees of the Boston Elevated
Railroad Company, appointed by the governor and sworn in to manage
the railroad, receiving their salary from the company, were public offi-
cers; but it was held that the doctrine of tax immunity was inherently
limited to the usual governmental functions and that running a railroad
was not such a function. The later case of Helvering v. Therrell5 held
that state liquidators of insolvent companies, appointed by the state
comptroller but paid from the assets of the companies, were taxable;
the court used all three of the possible limitations upon the doctrine,
among them the fact that "the business about which they were employed
was not one utilized by the State in the discharge of her essential govern-
mental functions."
9 199 U.S. 437 at 461, 26 S. Ct. 110, 50 L. Ed. 261 at 269 (1905). Italics are the
writer's. Compare Ambrosini v. U.S., 187 U.S. 1, 23 S. Ct. 1, 47 L. Ed. 49 (1902).
10 220 U.S. 107 at 172, 31 S. Ct. 342, 55 L. Ed. 389 at 422 (1911).
11 University of Ill. v. U.S., 289 U.S. 48 at 59, 53 S. Ct. 509, 77 L. Ed. 1025 at
1029 (1933).
12 292 U.S. 360, 54 S. Ct. 725, 78 L. Ed. 1307 (1934).
Is "In the South Carolina case this court disposed of the question by holding
that since the state was not exempt from the tax, the statute reached the individ-
ual sellers who acted as dispensers for the state. While not rejecting that view,
we prefer . . . to place our ruling upon the broader ground that the state itself,
when it becomes a dealer in intoxicating liquors, falls within the reach of the
tax. . . ." Ibid. at U.S. 371, L. Ed. 1310.
14 293 U.S. 214 at 225, 55 S. Ct. 171, 79 L. Ed. 291 at 295 (1934).
15 303 U.S. 218 at 225, 58 S. Ct. 539, 82 L. Ed. 758 at 764 (1938). Compare
Brush v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 300 U.S. 352, 57 S. Ct. 495, 81 L. Ed.
691 (1937), holding that a water supply maintenance was an essential governmental
function and that its engineer was tax-exempt. The Brush case has been limited,
in that the burden limitation should have been employed, by Helvering v. Gerhardt,
304 U.S. 405 at 423. 58 S. Ct. 969, 82 L. Ed. 1427 at 1438 (1938).
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The Employee Limitation
This boundary-line, which assumes logicality only if we adopt the
theory that the courts, irked with the rule of Collector v. Day, intend to
restrict that case to its facts and not to broaden out the doctrine to its
logical implications, has had far more play in the Circuit Courts than in
the Supreme Court. Some dicta employed by Justice Holmes 16 ran before
the decision in Metcalfe & Eddy v. Mitchell,17 wherein a partnership of
consulting engineers was held amenable to a Federal income tax even
though work had been done for a state. Affirmed the court, "We do de-
cide that no one who is not an officer or employee of a state, does not
establish exemption from Federal income tax merely by showing that his
income was received as compensation for service rendered under a
contract with the state. .. ."
However, the court also said that it should not be understood as fixing
a rule that taxation might not affect agencies like this so as to interfere
with governmental functions. This seems to support the proposal that an
independent contractor could still be immune as a state instrumentality,
but it has not been so taken by the lower courts.
The Burden Limitation
If a tax may be imposed upon a state instrumentality as long as it does
not burden the state, even though it be stated that the Day case is not
overruled, we need no longer be troubled about that case, for, so limited,
it no longer need be overruled. The Metcalfe case, by placing a second
ground for its decision to stand upon, became authority for the burden
limitation when the opinion said: "When we take the next step necessary
to a complete disposition of the question, and inquire into the effect of the
particular tax on the functioning of the state government, we do not find
that it impairs in any substantial manner the ability of plaintiffs in
error to discharge their obligations to the state, or the ability of a state or
its subdivisions to procure the services of private individuals to aid them
in their undertakings.'
' i8
Federal taxes on the income derived from selling oil and gas under
leases of state land have been upheld on the ground that such a "nondis-
criminatory tax" has too "remote and indirect" an effect.19 The latest
decision on that point is Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corporation,
20
which said in the course of a similar holding, "In numerous decisions we
have had . . . occasion to declare the competing principle, buttressed by
the most cogent considerations, that the power to tax should not be
crippled 'by extending the constitutional exemption from taxation to
16 Baltimore Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Baltimore, 195 U.S. 375, 25 S. Ct. 50,
49 L. Ed. 242 at 245 (1904).
17 269 U.S. 514 at 526, 46 S. Ct. 172, 70 L. Ed. 384 at 393 (1926). 18 Ibid.
19 Group No. 1 Oil Corp. v. Bass, 283 U.S. 279 at 282, 51 S. Ct. 432, 75 L. Ed.
1032 at 1036 (1931); Burnet v. A. T. Jergins Trust, 288 U.S. 508 at 516, 53 S. Ct. 439,
77 L. Ed. 925 at 928 (1933); Indian Territory Illuinating Oil Co. v. Board of
Equalization, 288 U.S. 325, 53 S. Ct. 388, 77 L. Ed. 812 (1933).
20 303 U.S. 376 at 385, 58 S. Ct. 623, 82 L. Ed. 907 at 913 (1938).
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those subjects which fall within the general application of non-discrimina-
tory laws, and where no direct burden is laid upon the governmental
instrumentality and there is only remote, if any, influence upon the
exercise of the functions of government.' "
The Therrell case, already mentioned in connection with the other
limitations, counted as one ground of its decision the fact that "the com-
pensation of the taxpayers was paid from corporate assets-not from
funds belonging to the State."'21 Capping these decisions has come Hel-
vering v. Gerhardt,22 holding taxable the salaries of employees of the
Port of New York Authority, a bi-state corporation created by compact be-
tween New York and New Jersey which has erected interstate bridges
and tunnels and maintains a bus line, getting income from the bus line
and from tolls. It is operated in the public interest, having no stock and
not being owned by private persons.
The court pointed out that in M'Culloch v. Maryland Marshall had dis-
tinguished between the power of the state and the power of the national
government, the latter being supreme. Collector v. Day was limited to
the facts in that case. 23 Although the governmental function limitation
was mentioned, 24 the Gerhardt decision seems to have been placed upon
the ground that this, as a nondiscriminatory tax, placed no substantial
burden upon the state.25
Though asked to overrule the Day case, the court left the door open
to possible rulings against taxes. 26 Nevertheless, though it may not have
cut the tree down, in lopping off the branches the court left only the bare
trunk remaining.
And now have come two cases striking at the basis of tax-exemption of
the salaries of state employees. Graves et al. v. People of New York ex
rel. O'Keefe27 has decided that a state may tax the income of a Federal
21 Helvering v. Therrell, 303 U.S. 218 at 225, 58 S. Ct. 539, 82 L. Ed. 758 at 764
(1938).
22 304 U.S. 405, 58 S. Ct. 969, 82 L. Ed. 1427 (1938).
23 "It is enough for present purposes that the state immunity from the national
taxing power, when recognized in Collector v. Day . . . was narrowly limited to
a state judicial officer engaged in the performance of a function which pertained
to state governments at the time the Constitution was adopted, without which no
state 'could long preserve its existence.' " At U.S. 415, L. Ed. 1434.
24 "The one [limitation] excludes from the immunity activities thought not to
be essential to the preservation of state governments even though the tax be
collected from the state treasury. . . ." At U.S. 419, L. Ed. 1437.
25 "The basis upon which constitutional tax immunity of a state has been
supported is the protection which it affords to the continued existence of the state.
To attain that end it is not ordinarily necessary to confer on the state a competi-
tive advantage over private persons in carrying on the operation of its government.
There is no such necessity here, and the resulting impairment of the Federal
power to tax argues against the advantage." At U.S. 421, L. Ed. 1438.
26 "There may be state agencies of such a character and so intimately associated
with the performance of an indispensable function of state government that any
taxation of it would threaten such interference with the functions of government
itself as to be considered beyond the reach of the Federal taxing power. If the
tax considered in Collector v. Day . . . may be regarded as such an instance,
that is not the case presented here. At U.S. 424, L. Ed. 1439.
27 59 S. Ct. 595 (1939).
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officer. State instrumentalities were differentiated from those of the
Federal government in that the national government is supreme in the
exercise of any of its delegated powers, "so that every agency which Con-
gress can constitutionally create is a governmental agency;" but even
with this assumption, an attorney employed by the Home Owners' Loan
Corporation at an annual salary was held taxable by the state. The court
held that a non-discriminatory tax on the income received from a sov-
ereign was no longer considered a tax upon the source of that income.
Although the court left open the question whether a tax would be per-
missible if Congress had expressly barred a state tax, it mentioned the
point as to whether Congress could expand the exemption "beyond the
constitutional immunity of federal agencies which courts have im-
plied. .. ."
The reason for the rule of Collector v. Day has been taken out from
under that case. If the national sovereign's supremacy is not violated by
allowing its employees to be taxed, the same principle must apply to the
employees of the lesser sovereign, even though it be considered indepen-
dent in its sphere. Hence the sweeping statement of the court in this
recent case cannot be considered mere dictum when it says, "Collector v.
Day. .. and New York ex rel. Rogers v. Graves ... are overruled so far
as they recognize an implied constitutional immunity from income tax-
ation of the salaries of officers or employees of the national or a state
government or their instrumentalities."
Justice Frankfurter added a few concurring remarks, tracing the origin
of tax immunity from Marshall's famous dictum and strongly attacking
the Dobbins and Day cases, stating them to be overruled by this case.
Thereby he fulfills the prophecy of a writer who ventured the opinion
that the Justice will be inclined to restrict as far as possible intergovern-
mental immunity from taxation. 28
On the same day that the above decision was handed down, the Supreme
Court in State Tax Commission of Utah v. Van Cott 29 held that an attorney
for the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and Regional Agricultural
Credit Corporation could be taxed by the state of Utah. The case was
decided on the basis of the O'Keefe case above; and Justice Black, writ-
ing the opinion of the court, stated, "Salaries of employees or officials
of the Federal Government or its instrumentalities are no longer immune,
under the Federal Constitution, from taxation by the states." The case,
however, was remanded to the Supreme Court of Utah to determine a
construction of the state statute.
The cases take on added strength when we notice that the court in the
O'Keefe case interpreted the Gerhardt case as being decided upon the
burden theory and not merely upon the governmental function limitation;
and in effect the Gerhardt case was treated as taking ample care of the
immunity doctrine in regard to state employees.
28 W. Hamilton, "Preview of a Justice," 48 Yale L. J. 819 at 835.
29 59 S. Ct. 605 (1939).
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The History of Tax Immunity in the Circuit Courts
Some varied applications of Collector v. Day have obtained in the
different circuits, which is only natural when one considers the qualifica-
tions which have been later put upon that case. In the First Circuit,
exemption has not been the exception; auditors appointed to hear judicial
hearings were held exempt as public officers, 0 and trustees of an elevated
railway system were held exempt,3 ' but the Supreme Court reversed the
decision in the Powers case, already discussed. The First Circuit re-
jected the burden limitation, saying that the immunity where it existed
was absolute, holding a superintendent of public parks in a municipality
tax-exempt.3
2
Quite generally an attorney who merely represents a state in exchange
for fees has been held a mere independent contractor, and this has been
affirmed by the Second Circuit even though the attorney took an oath of
office and was appointed a special deputy attorney general.8 The amount
of time spent upon the public duties seems to aid in determining whether
the employee limitation should be applied. Thus a consulting engineer to
a river commission, who spent only about two days monthly on his public
duties, was held not exempt from income tax, since he was a mere inde-
pendent contractor.8 4 A later case, however, decided that an attorney,
though engaging in other practice, was exempt as a state official where
he was appointed pursuant to a statute, took an oath of office, and had a
regular salary.8 5
However, the Second Circuit has applied the burden limitation liber-
ally,3 6 the most recent and startling instance being Saxe v. Shea,8 7 where
30 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Ogden, 62 F. (2d) 334 (1932).
81 Powers v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 68 F. (2d) 634 (1934).
32 "It is urged that to tax the salary . . . cannot burden the functions of the
state government sufficiently to hold that it is such a substantial interference as
to exempt such official from taxation, but as the [Supreme] court said in Indian
Motorcycle Co. v. United States, supra: 'Where the principle applies it is not
affected by the amount of the particular tax or the extent of the resulting inter-
ference, but is absolute .... .' " Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Sherman,
69 F. (2d) 755 at 758 (1934).
33 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Murphy, 70 F. (2d) 790 (1934), cert. den.
293 U.S. 596, 55 S. Ct. 111, 79 L. Ed. 690 (1934); Buckner v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 77 F. (2d) 297 (1935); Medalie v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 77 F. (2d) 300 (1935).
34 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Modjeski, 75 F. (2d) 468 (1935), cert.
den. 295 U.S. 764, 55 S. Ct. 924, 79 L. Ed. 1706 (1935).
35 Helvering v. Curren, 90 F. (2d) 621 (1937). See also Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Ten Eyck, 76 F. (2d) 515 (1935), holding chairman of a port district
commission tax-exempt.
86 McLoughlin v. Commissioner of Internal Revnue, 89 F. (2d) 699 at 701 (1937),
holding a liquidating agent of the New York Liquidation Bureau not exempt in the
following language: "It is unnecessary for us to deal with the question as to
whether the taxpayer when acting as counsel for the Liquidating Bureau was
engaged by the state in the exercise of essential governmental powers. It may
well be that his activities were essential. . . . Irrespective of any such relation
to the state, there can be no exemption from federal taxation where, as here,
taxation would result in no burden upon the governmental power of the state."
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the Federal income tax was held applicable to one appointed by a state
court in specific cases to act as referee or specihl guardian. The court,
hearing the case after the Gerhardt decision had come down, but not
after the later cases, decided that, since the appellant's compensation
did not come from the state treasury but from fees paid by parties litigant
or by estates, the Gerhardt case necessitated the holding that the appel-
lant was taxable, there being no burden on the state.
In the Third Circuit, the exemption was at first allowed freely, even
being extended to the fees an attorney gained from the state;38 but this
was reversed by the Supreme Court.3 9 Retainers given attorneys by the
state were held for a while to make them employees, 40 but this has re-
cently been overruled.41 Following the Metcalfe case in the Supreme
Court, partnerships acting as stenographers and record-indexers for a
state were held taxable.
42
Even though one devotes all his time to work on a government instru-
mentality, it has been possible to be an independent contractor amenable
to Federal income taxes, according to the Fourth Circuit.43 However, an
attorney given a retainer has there been held to be an employee.
44
The history of exemption from taxation in the Fifth Circuit followed
the pattern laid down in the Third Circuit, at first holding that attorneys
were even exempt in regard to fees received from a state ;45 but this hold-
ing was reversed by the Supreme Court. 46 Again an attorney hired by the
state for a fixed salary was held exempt as an employee, 47 but later cases
held the contrary. 48 However, the superintendent of a school cafeteria
has been held exempt as a state employee in a governmental function.49
Aff'd, 303 U.S. 218,. 58 S. Ct. 539, 82 L. Ed. 758 (1938). See also Harman v. Helver-
ing, 90 F. (2d) 622 (1937), cert. den. 303 U.S. 650, 58 S. Ct. 743, 82 L. Ed. 1111 (1937).
37 98 F. (2d) 83 at 84 (1938), cert. granted 59 S. Ct. 154, 83 L. Ed. 125 (1938).
38 Reed v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 34 F. (2d) 263 (1929).
39 Lucas v. Reed, 281 U.S. 699, 50 S. Ct. 352, 74 L. Ed. 1125 (1929).
40 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Hindman, 88 F. (2d) 44 (1937); Com-
missibner of Internal Revenue v. Coughlin, 87 F. (2d) 670 (1937).
41 Ewart v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 98 F. (2d) 649 (1938); Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue v. Emerson, 98 F. (2d) 650 (1938), cert. den. 59
S. Ct. 146, 83 L. Ed. 90 (1938). See also Watson v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 81 F. (2d) 626 (1936).
42 Lewis v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 47 F. (2d) 32 (1931); Russell v.
Heiner, 53 F. (2d) 1009 (1931). See also Miller v. McCaughn, 27 F. (2d) 128 (1928),
holding a court-appointed investigator of surety companies taxable because "no
power of the state is crippled or lessened by his paying tax on his income.
Neither the state nor the court pay Mr. Miller."
43 Underwood v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 56 F. (2d) 67 (1932), hold-
ing taxable a construction engineer, because of his freedom from control.
44 Burnet v. Livezey, 48 F. (2d) 159 (1931).
45 Blair v. Matthews, 29 F. (2d) 892 (1928); Howard v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 29 F. (2d) 895 (1928).
46 Lucas v. Howard, 280 U.S. 526, 50 S. Ct. 87, 74 L. Ed. 593 (1929), memorandum
decision on authority of the Metcalfe case.
47 United States v. Butler, 49 F. (2d) 52 (1931).
48 Register v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 69 F. (2d) 607, 93 A. L. R. 186
(1934); Burges v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 69 F. (2d) 609 (1934). See
also Brown v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 55 F. (2d) 1076 (1932), cert. den.
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Cases in the Sixth Circuit have not encouraged exemption; the em-
ployees of a charitable trust accepted by the state were held not to be
employed in a governmental function, 50 and an engineer constructing
streets on a percentage fee basis has been considered a mere independent
contractor. 51
The Eighth Circuit 52 has been averse to extending the exemption from
Federal taxation. Attorneys for a municipal waterworks board were held
taxable, not only upon the ground that the attorneys were independent
contractors, but also because a waterworks was a proprietary rather
than a governmental function.53 A partnership constructing and repairing
state buildings was held liable to a tax on the profits therefrom, since it
was an independent contractor; 54 though here the fallacy of a distinction
between independent contractor and employee is obvious-the state
would be crippled if it could not get buildings for its administration even
if the buildings were to be made by outsiders.
Following the usual trend, the Ninth Circuit has held attorneys for
irrigation and reclamation districts mere independent contractors and as
such taxable.55 Similarly, that court was probably in accord with the
general concept when it held a board of park commissioners exempt from
Federal income taxes. 56 However, an attorney for the Golden Gate
Bridge and Highway District was given exemption as an officer in an
essential governmental function, even though he held his position at the
pleasure of the board and used his own discretion in the conduct of his
287 U.S. 602, 53 S. Ct. 8, 77 L. Ed. 524 (1932), holding taxable income from the
city of Atlanta as supervising architect for a number of public school buildings;
Roberts v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 44 F. (2d) 168 (1930), holding
taxable a collector of delinquent taxes who was paid by a commission on the
amount collected.
49 Hoskins v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 84 F. (2d) 627 (1936).
50 Ogilvie v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 36 F. (2d) 473 (1929). See also
Bettman v. Warwick, 108 F. 46 at 48 (1901), relating to Federal stamp tax on a
bond required of the state by a notary public and holding, "The test as to whether
a notary is engaged in, the exercise of the governmental powers of the state does
not depend upon how his compensation is provided."
51 Pease v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 83 F. (2d) 122 (1936), cert. den.
299 U.S. 562, 57 S. Ct. 25, 81 L. Ed. 414 (1936).
52 The Seventh Circuit, because of a late case arising therein, will be discussed
last.
53 Blair v. Byers, 35 F. (2d) 326 (1929); Denman v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 73 F. (2d) 193 (1934). The Supreme Court later commented, "We have
not failed to give careful consideration to Blair v. Byers . . . and Denman v. Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue . . . both of which take a view contrary to that
which we have expressed. To the extent of this conflict, those cases are dis-
approved." Brush v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 300 U.S. 373, 57 S. Ct.
502, 81 L. Ed. 701 (1937). But the Brush case has also been limited in Helvering
v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405 at 423, 58 S. Ct. 969, 82 L. Ed. 1427 at 1428 (1938). See
also Burnet v. McDonough, 46 F. (2d) 944 (1931), holding attorney who continued in
private practice taxable as mere independent contractor; Burnet v. Jones, 50 F.
(2d) 14 (1931), containing a similar holding.
54 Kreipke v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 32 F. (2d) 594 (1929).
55 Childers v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 80 F. (2d) 27 (1935); Devlin v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 82 F. (2d) 731 (1936).
56 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Lamb, 82 F. (2d) 733 (1936).
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duties, 57 whereas in a later case an engineer for the same district was
held an independent contractor, not exempt.58
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has held that a
township engineer, whose payment was partly a regular annual retainer
and partly a percentage according to the number of public improvement
contracts, is exempt. 59 Concurring with the usual holdings, an attorney
hired by the state on a contingent fee basis was held not an officer or an
employee.60 A recent case held that a full-time attorney, appointed in
accordance with a statute to collect delinquent land taxes and paid from
a penalty added to the tax collected, was a state officer, exempt from a
Federal income tax.61 The court realized that the recent cases showed a
trend away from the doctrine of Collector v. Day, but said, "Until the
Supreme Court decides definitely that the rule of absolute immunity be-
cause of sovereign independence in the exercise of essential governmental
duties is no longer applicable, we think we should not be justified in depart-
ing from the long established principle." However, the case was decided
without the benefit of the Gerhardt case or the two later cases.
In the Seventh Circuit, the standard limitations have generally been
followed. The governmental function limitation enabled the Federal gov-
ernment to strike at the salary of a real estate expert employed by a
municipal board of public improvements. 62 Special attorneys, as usual,
were held not exempt,6 3 but a general attorney for a municipal board,
who was appointed for a year at an annual salary, was held exempt as an
officer; 64 and even additional services rendered by him for fees were
considered rendered as an officer and exempt.
Perhaps this last case was the forerunner of the recently decided
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Stilwell.65 Decided after the Ger-
hardt case, but before the two later cases, the case held that a Master-in-
Chancery was not taxable. He was paid from fees taxed against the losing
party in litigation, but the court here flatly rejected the burden limitation.
The Gerhardt case was distinguished on the ground that it had decided
merely that the Port of New York Authority was not an essential govern-
57 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Harlan, 80 F. (2d) 660 (1935).
58 Strauss v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 97 F. (2d) 549 (1938).
59 Halsey v. Helvering, 75 F. (2d) 234 (1934).
60 Norcross v. Helvering, 75 F. (2d) 679 (1935).
61 Brown v. Helvering, 97 F. (2d) 189 at 192 (1938).
62 Lyons v. Reinecke, 10 F. (2d) 3 (1925).
63 Haight v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 52 F. (2d) 779 (1931), cert. den.
Adcock v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 2851U.S. 537, 52 S. Ct. 311, 76 L. Ed.
931 (1931).
64 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Schnackenberg, 90 F. (2d) 175 (1937).
See also Consoer, Older & Quinlan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 85 F. (2d)
461 (1936), holding an engineering corporation, employed by twenty villages to
perform all engineering work on improvements, taxable as an independent con-
tractor; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. DeLeuw, 95 F. (2d) 647 (1937), hold-
ing an assistant engineer on a Chicago transportation committee, paid according
to time expended, independent contractor; Campbell v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 87 F. (2d) 128 (1936); Elam v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 45 F.
(2d) 337 (1930).
65 101 F. (2d) 588 (1939).
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mental function. Although some language in the Gerhardt opinion sup-
ports this contention, 66 the preponderance of the opinion makes this un-
likely, especially since the Supreme Court does not at all attempt to
overrule Brush v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue67 in regard to the
"governmental function" part of the decision-instead fastening the bur-
den limitation to that case.6 8 Further, the Supreme Court in the O'Keefe
case interprets the Gerhardt case as being decided upon the burden
ground. A dissent in the Stilwell case, relying on the Gerhardt case, said
that the burden limitation was controlling, and cited the Saxe case in the
Second Circuit as holding that the source of compensation would here
destroy immunity from taxation. It seems probable that after the O'Keefe
case the Stilwell case would have been decided differently than it was.
Conclusion
The doctrine of intergovernmental immunity from even nondiscrimina-
tory taxation has been narrowed down by limitations from its once broad
foundation. The Gerhardt case, with its burden limitation, wellnigh de-
stroyed the doctrine even before the O'Keefe case. With the recent holding
that Federal employees are no longer exempt from state taxation, and the
statements therein that the state governments have even less claim to
supremacy than the national government, it is probable that the immunity
of state employees has been destroyed. Indeed, even though we have no
case squarely on a factual parallel which states this, the statement in the
O'Keefe case that the Day case is overruled provides a guide as to what
the future conduct of the Supreme Court will be.
Thus a hundred years of litigation as to whether one is within the sacred
immunity or without has come to an end. The new problem to be faced
by the court, as pointed out by Mr. Justice Butler in his dissent in the
O'Keefe case, is to decide whether a tax is a burden on the discharge of a
state function. It remains to be seen whether this is as impossible as the
Justice prophecies that it will be. Be that as it may, it is a different rule,
and it must be met with a new technique. R. W. BERGSTROM.
JURISDICTION OF THE ILLINOIS PROBATE CoURTS
The jurisdiction of the probate courts is defined by the Constitution of
Illinois in the following terms: "The general assembly may provide for
the establishment of a probate court in each county having a population
of over 50,000 .... Said courts, when established, shall have an original
jurisdiction of all probate matters, the settlement of estates of deceased
66 Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405 at 415 and 424, 58 S. Ct. 969, 82 L. Ed.
1427 at 1434 and 1439 (1938).
67 300 U.S. 352, 57 S. Ct. 495, 81 L. Ed. 691 (1937).
68 "No contention was made by it [the government] or considered or decided
by the Court that the burden of the tax on the state was so indirect or conjectural
as to be but an incident of the coexistence of the two governments, and therefore
not within the constitutional immunity. If determination of that point was implicit
in the decision it must be limited by what is now decided." Helvering v. Gerhardt,
304 U.S. 405 at 423, 58 S. Ct. 969, 82 L. Ed. 1427 at 1438 (1938).
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persons, the appointment of guardians and conservators, and settlement
of their accounts; in all matters relating to apprentices, and in cases of
the sales of real estate of deceased persons for the payment of debts."'
It is well settled that the legislature may not increase the powers of the
courts beyond these terms.2 And the legislature, seemingly in recognition
of this fact, reiterated the very language above in the act of 18773 creating
the probate courts. Thus, where the courts have acted under the general
provisions of the statute of 1877, the language thereof must be interpreted
in order to determine the validity of the court's conduct. 4 On the other
hand, where the court acts under the authority of some other legislative
provision specifically authorizing such conduct, the validity of that con-
duct can only be ascertained by a determination of the constitutionality
of the specific provision in question. 5 But in either case the language to
be interpreted is the same, since the constitutional provision and the act
of 1877 creating the probate courts are couched in identical terms.
There has been a difference of opinion as to the meaning of the rather
general terms, probate matters and settlement of estates, in the constitu-
tional grant of powers.8 The word probate is defined by Blackstone as the
proof of a will and the registering thereof. 7 This definition has been adopted
by many courts as the strict connotation of the word. 8 However, as early
as 1829, the Supreme Court of the United States indicated a popular usage,9
and later cases have held that probate is often employed as applying to
1 Illinois Constitution of 1870, Art. 6, § 20.
2 Where jurisdiction of a particular court is defined by Constitution, the legis-
lature cannot by statute restrict or enlarge that jurisdiction. Wilson v. Lucas, 185
Ark. 183, 47 S. W. (2d) 8 (1932); People v. Barbera, 78 Cal. App. 277, 248 P. 304
(1926); Spafford v. Brevard County, 92 Fla. 617, 110 So. 451 (1926); American
Mills Co. v. Doyal, 174 Ga. 631, 163 S. E. 603 (1932); Howard v. Swift, 356 IM. 80,
190 N. E. 102 (1934), involving the probate courts; First State Bank of Steger v.
Chicago Title & Trust Co., 302 Ill. 77, 134 N.E. 46 (1922), also dealing with the
probate courts.
3 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 37, § 303.
4 Moore v. State Bank of Chicago, 291 Ill. 372, 126 N.E. 165 (1920).
5 In re Estate of Mortenson, 248 Ill. 520, 94 N.E. 120 (1911).
6 It is arguable that the framers of the Constitution intended the probate courts
to take over the entire "probate" jurisdiction of the county courts and to super-
sede them in this respect. And indeed the act of 1877 so provides. From this,
the conclusion might be drawn that any "probate" function formerly exercised
by the county courts would be within the jurisdiction of the probate courts, but
the cases have not so held. Seelye v. People, 40 Ill. App. 449 (1891), rev. 146
Ill. 189, 32 N.E. 458 (1892), states that "section 20 of Article 6 of the Constitution
does not enjoin, but permits, the creation of Probate Courts, and the only effect
of it is to enable the Legislature to do what it might have done without that
section, but for the limitation of the judicial power to courts mentioned in Sec
1 of the same article." In view of the later decisions, this remark is too broad.
7 Blackstone, Commentaries (New ed.), II, 508.
8 J. G. Woerner, A Treatise on the American Law of Administration (Little,
Brown, and Co., Boston, 2d ed., 1899), I, 319, § 140; Dibble v. Winter, 247 III. 243,
93 N.E. 145 (1910); Johnson v. Harrison, 47 Minn. 575, 50 N.W. 923, 28 Am. St. Rep.
382 (1891); Reno v. McCully, 65 Iowa 629, 22 N.W. 902 (1885).
9 The Bank of Hamilton v. The Lessee of Dudley, 2 U.S. (Pet.) 492, 7 L. Ed. 496
at 499 (1829).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
any of the incidents of administration.1 0 The term settlement of estates
is also used in more than one sense. Some courts indicate that it is the
method by which the accounts of the executor or administrator are ap-
proved.1 On the other hand, the phrase has been employed to indicate
the "process by which letters testamentary or of administration are
granted, assets collected, claims allowed, debts paid, real estate sold if
necessary for the payment of debts, and the property distributed to those
who are entitled to it by the laws of descent or by the will."12
The most recent decision dealing with jurisdiction over the administra-
tion of decedents' estates is that in the case of Rosen v. Rosen,'s where a
direct appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of Illinois from an order
of the Probate Court of Cook County vacating a former order for the sale
of real estate to pay certain legacies which were charges upon the realty.
The order of sale was made pursuant to Section 137 of the Administration
of Estates Act,1 4 which reads as follows: "Where it appears that a legacy
... is a charge... upon the real estate of decedent, and there is not suf-
ficient personal estate of said decedent out of which such legacy can
properly be satisfied. . . then the ... Probate Court . .. may . . . order
10 "The term 'probate,' when strictly used, relates to the proof of a will....
In common usage, however, it is often used with reference to the proceedings
incident to the administration and settlement of the estates of decedents .. "
Reno v. McCully, 65 Iowa 629, 22 N.W. 902 (1885). "While the word 'probate,' in
a technical sense, means the official proof of an instrument offered as a last will
and testament, the term 'probate matters' has acquired a much wider meaning,
and the words were undoubtedly used in the constitution in a broad and general
sense." In re Estate of Mortenson, 248 Ill. 520 at 525, 94 N.E. 120 (1911); Dibble
v. Winter, 247 Ill. 243 at 262, 93 N.E. 145 (1910); Johnson v. Harrison, 47 Minn.
575, 50 N.W. 923, 28 Am. St. Rep. 382 (1891).
11 "The estate was duly settled and the balance in the hands of the executor
ascertained .... The executor or administrator as a trustee receives the estate
of a deceased person, administers upon it according to law, and presents an ac-
count of his adminstration, and it is settled by the court. The balance found on
such settlement is a balance of the estate undisposed of remaining for distribu-
tion...." Sellew's Appeal from Probate, 36 Conn. 186 at 191, 193 (1869). "In
cases of legacy and distribution, the chancellor has jurisdiction, by the English
law, concurrently with the spiritual court; and the account is settled in the one
court or the other .. " Clark v. Callaghan, 2 Watts' (Pa.) 259 (1834). "The Court
should have ordered an account, notwithstanding the settlement with the judge
of the County Court. . . ." Cherry v. Belcher, 5 Stew. & P. (Ala.) 133 at 138 (1833).
"The words 'settlement of the estate,' as commonly understood, and as used in
the statute, when applied to the estate of deceased persons, refer to the settle-
ment of the probate account." Allen v. Dean, 148 Mass. 594, 20 N.E. 314 (1889).
12 In re Estate of Mortenson, 248 Ill. 520 at 525, 94 N.E. 120 (1911); Black, Law
Dictionary (3rd ed.), 1613, citing Calkins v. Smith, 41 Mich. 409, 1 N.W. 1048
(1879); Forbes v. Harrington, 171 Mass. 386, 50 N.E. 641 (1898); Appeal of Mathews,
72 Conn- 555, 45 A. 170 (1900); Pearce v. Pearce, 199 Ala. 491, 74 So. 952 at 957
(1917). "The words 'settlements of estates of deceased persons,' evidently refer
to the adjustment of the claims and demands in favor or against an estate. They
do not necessarily include the word 'distribution.... .. In re Creighton, 12 Neb.
280, 11 N.W. 313 (1882).
's 370 IIl. 173, 18 N.E. (2d) 218 (1938).
14 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 3, § 139.
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the sale of real estate upon which such legacy is a charge. . . " The sole
question considered was the constitutionality of this provision. The court
adopted the broad definition of probate matters and settlement of estates
which includes all of the incidents of administration and decided that the
section was valid. Curiously enough, there was no mention of the doctrine
that expressio unius est exclusio alterius,15 which was here applicable in
that the constitutional grant of jurisdiction expressly includes "the sales
of realty of deceased persons for the payment of debts" and therefore by
implication should exclude the sale of realty for any other purpose. It
may well be that the court considered the maxim and decided that its ap-
plication would have resulted in too narrow a construction 16 of the terms
probate matters and settlement of estates, and on the other hand the doc-
trine may have been overlooked. It is evident from the opinion that the
court regards as constitutional any provision granting a power which is
reasonably necessary and incident to the granting of letters testamentary
or of administration, the collection of assets, the allowing of claims, the
payment of debts, the selling of realty if necessary for the payment of
debts, and the distribution of property to those who are entitled to it by
the laws of descent or by the will.
In this regard, the courts have many times been called upon to deter-
mine what is incident to the settlement of a deceased's estate, and the
determination in each case has resulted in a broad definition of the juris-
diction of the probate courts. Although the Constitution, as has been noted,
did not confer general chancery powers, 17 it has been held without any
variance that the nature of the jurisdiction is equitable.' 8 For example,
the power to establish the existence of a lost will has been held to be
within the exclusive powers of the probate courts as an incident to the
probating of the wills,19 and the same rule has been laid down with regard
to the reformation of wills in cases of spoliation, whether innocent or
fraudulent.20 Similarly, the power to set aside the probate of a will has
15 The rule is part of the more comprehensive doctrine that a construction of
a written instrument should be made-if possible-which gives meaning to every
portion of the language. Broom, Legal Maxims (2d ed.), 515. See also State v.
Tucson Gas, Electric Light & Power Co., 15 Ariz. 294, 138 P. 781 (1914); State ex
rel. West v. Butler, 70 Fla. 102, 69 So. 771 (1915); People ex rel. McCullough v.
Deutsche Evangelisch Lutherische Jehovah Gemeinde Ungeanderter Augsbur-
gische Confession, 249 Ill. 132, 94 N.E. 162 (1911).
16 "The enlightened patriots who framed our constitution, and the people who
adopted it, must be understood to have employed words in their natural sense,
and to have intended what they have said." Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
1 at 188, 6 L. Ed. 23 at 68 (1824). "Narrow and technical reasoning is misplaced
when it is brought to bear upon an instrument framed by the people themselves.
• . ." Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (8th ed.), I, 131, 132.
17 Rook v. Rook, 111 I11. App. 398 (1903).
18 Whittemore v. Coleman, 239 Ill. 450, 88 N.E. 228 (1909).
19 "In this state a court of equity has no jurisdiction to establish the existence
of a lost or destroyed will, as that matter, as well as the probating of the will after
it has been established is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the probate court."
Mather v. Minard, 260 Ill. 175, 102 N.E. 1062 (1913).
20 Mather v. Minard, 260 Ill. 175, 102 N.E. 1062 (1913).
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been recognized. 21 And the power to construe a will has been upheld as
an incident to the payment of legacies22 by a court which assumed without
discussion that the payment of legacies was necessary to the "settlement
of estates of deceased persons." Jurisdiction over equitable claims23 and
assignments 24 seems well established. It has also been held that "a pro-
bate court . . . may review, set aside, or modify previous judgments
allowing claims against the estate. '25 And the power to quiet title,26 as
well as the power to remove clouds27 from the title, to real estate sought
to be sold for the payment of debts has also been upheld.
The same tendencies toward a broad interpretation of the language of
the Constitution in regard to the scope of the jurisdiction of the probate
courts have been displayed in the cases involving guardians and conserv-
ators as have been evinced in the cases involving the estates of decedents.
The following decisions are grouped together, since it is believed that the
affirmation of a power in the case of a guardian would necessarily in-
volve the affirmation of that same power in the case of a conservator, and
vice versa, inasmuch as the jurisdiction of the probate courts is treated
as being identical in both instances by the language, "the appointment of
guardians and conservators, and settlement of their accounts. . . ," in
the Constitution. 28 In 1883, Winch v. Tobin,29 a leading case, upheld the
jurisdiction of the probate courts in the case of a sale of real estate by the
guardian of a minor's estate. The decision was placed largely upon a
broad interpretation of the phrase probate matters in the constitutional
grant of power. It would seem that the rule of construction that expressio
unius est exclusio alterius was weighed and found undesirable as leading
to too narrow an interpretation,30 although the fact that the framers of
the Constitution by the express statement of jurisdiction over "the sales
21 Schofield v. Thomas, 231 IIl. 114, 83 N.E. 121 (1907).
22 Strawn v. Trustees of Jacksonville Female Academy, 240 IM. 111, 88 N.E.
460 (1909).
23 Esmond v. Esmond, 154 IlL App. 357 (1910). See also Hurd v. Slaten, 43 IlL
348 (1867).
24 In re Estate of Kinsey, 261 Ill. App. 481 (1931). See also Dixon v. Buell, 21 IMl.
203 (1859).
25 Whittemore v. Coleman, 239 IM. 450, 88 N.E. 228 (1909).
26 Newell v. Montgomery, 129 Ill. 58, 21 N.E. 508 (1889).
27 Schottler v. Quinlan, 263 Ill. 637, 105 N.E. 710 (1914).
28 Illinois Constitution of 1870, Art. 6, § 20. 29 107 Ill. 212 (1883).
30 The court said: "Any supposed prohibition in the constitution to do this is
only to be derived by implication, from its enumeration of certain jurisdictional
powers which probate courts should have, and this specific power of ordering
sale of minor's real estate not being, in terms, named in the enumeration ...
There hardly seems reason why the same court that decrees sales of real estate
of deceased persons for the payment of debts, might not also order sales by
guardians.... The sale of real estate to pay debts of decedents does, perhaps, in
the greater number of cases, involve the selling of lands of minors." The above
language would seem to indicate that the court was troubled by the existence of
the express power "in cases of the sales of real estate of deceased persons for the
payment of debts" in the Constitution and was seeking to explain away the
possible implication that the power to sell real estate was confined to the
estates of decedents.
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of real estate of deceased persons" might have intended to deny the
power of sale in the case of a ward's estate was not discussed in the
opinion. The liberal tendencies of Winch v. Tobin 1 have been followed in
other decisions involving jurisdiction over matters relating to guardians
and conservators. "It seems to be held without discussion that the power
to appoint a conservator carries with it the implied power to declare a
person insane," '3 2 and this would seem to be an inescapable conclusion.
However, the case of First State Bank of Steger v. Chicago Title and Trust
Company3 3 went somewhat farther in upholding the constitutionality of a
statute requiring verified claims in the probate court in order to aid
the conservator in the economical ascertainment of just debts and in the
rendition of accounts. It has also been held that a probate court has the
power to remove a conservator who has refused, in contravention of the
best interests of the ward, to renounce the ward's dower interest in his
deceased spouse's estate and that the court should appoint a guardian ad
litem for the purpose of filing such a renunciation.
3 4
A definite limit, however, seems to have been set upon this tendency
toward expansion of the powers of the probate courts of Illinois. It would
seem that any matter which would require supervision beyond the period
of final distribution of an estate is beyond the meaning of the Constitu-
tion, 5 as are all other things not incident to the broadest meaning of the
terms, probate matters and settlement of estates, as heretofore defined.
Examples of such matters, as determined by the courts, are: the manage-
ment of testamentary trusts ;36 "the power to reform a written instrument
under seal . ..or to declare a deed absolute on its face, to be a mort-
gage; '"87 the compulsion of the completion of a bid by the highest bidder
at the sale of a deceased's realty for the payment of debts;38 the fore-
closure of a mortgage on a decendent's estate ;89 the cancellation of a deed
made by a legatee transferring his interest in the real estate of the de-
ceased to the administrator in his individual capacity who has obtained
the deed through fraud; 4° and the settlement of the account of a guardian
for money received by the guardian after the ward's majority.41
W. L. Sc m
31 107 Ill. 212 (1883).
32 Dowdall v. Hutchens, 263 Ill. App. 275 at 283 (1931), referring to Ure v. Ure,
223 III. 454, 79 N.E. 153 (1906); Snyder v. Snyder, 142 Ill. 60, 31 N.E. 303 (1892);
Sippel v. Wolf, 333 Ill. 284, 164 N.E. 678 (1928).
33 302 Ill. 77, 134 N.E. 46 (1922).
34 Davis v. Mather, 309 Ill. 284, 141 N.E. 209 (1923); Sippel v. Wolf, 333 Iml. 284,
164 N.E. 678 (1928).
35 In re Estate of Mortenson, 248 Ill. 520, 94 N.E. 120 (1911).
36 In re Estate of Mortenson, 248 Ill. 520, 94 N.E. 120 (1911); Frackelton v.
Masters, 249 Ill. 30, 94 N.E. 124 (1911).
37 Rook v. Rook, 111 Ill. App. 398 (1903).
38 Hannah v. Meinshausen, 299 Ill. 525, 132 N.E. 820 (1921).
39 People ex rel. Otis v. Loomis, 96 Ill. 377 (1880).
40 Dowdall v. Cannedy, 32 Ill. App. 207 (1889).
41 People v. Seelye, 146 IMI. 189, 32 N.E. 458 (1892).
